


# LE RETOUR DU JEU DES GRANDES PUISSANCES?



# I/ VIT-ON UN TOURNANT?

## Axis of No

United Nations Security Council, number of vetoes



Source: United Nations

The Economist

[REUTER World News](#)

January 19, 2018 / 5:27 PM / 5 months ago

**U.S. military puts 'great power competition' at heart of strategy: Mattis**

**Should U.S. Foreign Policy Focus on Great-Power Competition?**

**Foreign Affairs Asks the Experts**

October 13, 2020

**The New Concept Everyone in Washington Is Talking About**

How exactly did *great-power competition* go from being an “arcane term” a few years ago to “approaching a cliché”?

[Uri Friedman](#) The Atlantic Aug 6, 2019

**Nostalgic for Great Power Competition**

21 March 2018

The Pentagon is a bit too excited about the return of big geopolitical rivalries.

[Micah Zenko](#)



## The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers

By [Azar Gat](#)

[Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007](#)

China and Russia represent a return of economically successful authoritarian capitalist powers, which have been absent since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, but they are much larger than the latter two countries ever were. Although Germany was only a medium-sized country uncomfortably squeezed at the center of Europe, it twice nearly broke out of its confines to become a true world power on account of its economic and military might. In 1941, Japan was still behind the leading great powers in terms of economic development, but its growth rate since 1913 had been the highest in the world. Ultimately, however, both Germany and Japan were too small -- in terms of population, resources, and potential -- to take on the United States. Present-day China, on the other hand, is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is experiencing spectacular economic growth. By shifting from communism to capitalism, China has switched to a far more efficient brand of authoritarianism. As China rapidly narrows the economic gap with the developed world, the possibility looms that it will become a true authoritarian superpower

[@johngansjr \(John Gans\)](#)

Before becoming the talk of the town, “great power competition” was the talk of the Pentagon where I was a speechwriter until 2017. **Though not the first at the Defense Department to use the clunky term, Ash Carter made it one focus of his final year in office.** 2x

Thought awkward, it was useful in describing how militaries, particularly those of Russia and China were making the investments & advances - like missiles, cyber weapons, & space capabilities - necessary to compete with and perhaps challenge the long-dominant U.S. armed forces. 3/x

**The Obama White House HATED the term - one official deemed it a “slogan.” But the term had value in a big, opinionated building like the Pentagon, with its overlapping missions and plenty of myopia**

Without naming countries, the term got the individual services allies abroad, and Capitol Hill focused on something other than terrorism and bigger than parochial concerns

**It was thus no shock Carter’s successor James Mattis said, “Great Power competition...is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.”** Based on the number of think tank events about great power competition, clearly many in the Washington agreed.

When Ashton Carter began his career at the Pentagon, in 1993, geopolitics was changing more rapidly than it had at any point since the Second World War. As the Cold War ended, a new world was taking its place, one dominated by American power.

Carter, at the time, expected that America's greatest challenge in that world — and, by extension, the focus of his own career — would be limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, he told me in a recent interview at the Pentagon. And the greatest threat, he thought, would be political instability within nuclear-armed Russia.

"That was the riveting challenge of that time. We look back now, and I remember how fearful that was," he said. "But it worked out extraordinarily well."

Twenty-some years later, Carter now runs the Pentagon as defense secretary. The world, and the challenges it presents for the United States, turned out somewhat differently than he, or anyone else, had expected.

What Carter has seen over the past two decades, and has often overseen, is the long and difficult process whereby the United States has tried, and at times struggled, to navigate those unexpected turns in the grand experiment that is the post–Cold War world.

***The challenges of this era have only recently become clear: the failure and collapse of weak states, which can bring terrorism, civil war, and refugee influxes; rogue states that resist the American-led order and proliferate dangerous weapons; and now, according to Carter, a [return](#) to "great power competition."***

The new era of great power competition

Defense Secretary Ash Carter sees a world of heightened tension and even higher stakes.

by [Max Fisher](#) on April 13, 2016

<http://www.vox.com/2016/4/13/11333276/ash-carter-transcript>



## The Age of Great-Power Competition How the Trump Administration Refashioned American Strategy

By [Elbridge A. Colby](#) and [A. Wess Mitchell](#) FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
[January/February 2020](#)

This shift in Washington's focus has been some time coming. Elements of it emerged, mostly in a reactive form, under President Barack Obama. The Trump administration has gone one important step further, recognizing that great-power competition warrants rebuilding U.S. foreign policy from the ground up, and it has based its formal strategy documents on that recognition. When future historians look back at the actions of the United States in the early twenty-first century, by far the most consequential story will be the way Washington refocused its attention on great-power competition. Beneath today's often ephemeral headlines, it is this shift, and the reordering of U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic behavior that it entails, that will stand out—and likely drive U.S. foreign policy under presidents from either party for a long time to come.

But by now, the nature of the challenge, as an empirical fact, should be clear: the United States today faces rivals stronger and far more ambitious than at any time in recent history. China—seeking hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region first and global preeminence thereafter—is likely to become the most powerful rival that the United States has ever faced in its history. Russia may fall short of being a peer competitor but has proved capable of projecting power in ways few anticipated at the close of the Cold War. Today, it is intent on resurrecting its ascendancy in parts of eastern Europe that once fell within its sphere of influence and hopes to speed up the end of Western preeminence in the world at large. Its disruptive potential lies in part in its ability, through self-interested moves, to bring about systemic crises that will benefit Chinese power in the long term.

**The DOD has codified "GPC" --  
Great Power Competition - as an  
acronym. That means GCP is  
probably here to stay (mai 2021)**

America and the World—The Effects of the Trump Presidency  
*When Donald Met Washington: The Genesis of 'Great Power Competition'*

Essay by Emma Ashford, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Published on **1 July 2021** | [issforum.org](https://issforum.org)

<https://issforum.org/to/ps2021-44>

Yet perhaps the biggest foreign policy shift of Donald Trump's four years in office was wholeheartedly embraced by Washington's foreign policy community. First emerging in confirmation hearings, and then – more notably – as the core organizing principle of the 2017 *National Security Strategy*, “Great Power Competition” (GPC) has become the Washington buzzword of the decade.<sup>3</sup> And while many foreign policy hands might distance themselves from the more extreme aspects of the Trump-era approach to GPC – his destructive trade wars against China, for example – there is a widespread acceptance of the idea that U.S. foreign policy should shift its focus from counterterrorism in order to confront a rising China and revanchist Russia. As President Joe Biden put it in his speech at the 2021 Munich Security Conference: “Competition with China is going to be stiff. That's what I expect. And that's what I welcome.”

the language of Great Power Competition, with its open references to “ambitious, aggressive countries seeking regional dominance”<sup>10</sup> and “revisionist authoritarian forces,”<sup>11</sup> quickly took hold. Op-eds, think tank reports, panel discussions, and congressional testimony all began to reframe China and Russia as threats rather than opportunities, and to suggest that the naïve hopes of the 1990s had not been borne out.<sup>12</sup> Structural or power variables can only take us so far in explaining this shift. After all, the trendlines of China's rise, America's relative decline, and the world's gradual shift from unipolarity to multipolarity have been visible for a decade or more. Nor can we really explain it solely as a response to Chinese or Russian aggression. After all, Chinese island-building and Russia's military interventions go back to the time of the Obama, and George W. Bush presidencies. Yet the Bush administration sought to minimize tensions with Beijing over, for example, Taiwan, while the Obama administration's failed “pivot to Asia” was framed in substantially more benign terms than today's GPC language.

## Goodbye, “great power competition.” Hello, “strategic competition.”

A Defense Department spokesperson confirmed to our own **DANIEL LIPPMAN** and **LARA SELIGMAN** that the Pentagon will use the new phrase to describe its approach toward China — explicitly moving away from the Trump-era framework.

“Strategic competition” aligns more closely with the administration’s thinking on China. The DoD spokesperson, Lt. Col. **MARTIN MEINERS**, noted how the White House’s [Interim National Security Strategic Guidance](#) specifically refers to “strategic competition with China or any other nation.”

Forget the “any other nation”: this phrase is meant to encompass all the areas where Washington and Beijing might face off — namely, in technology, trade and, yes, the military realm.

However, the document also says that “strategic competition does not, and should not, preclude working with China when it is in our national interest to do so.”

The change is a clear pivot away from language used by the Trump administration, which employed the term “[great power competition](#)”

JAKE SULLIVAN: So basically, from my perspective, all of this talk of the United States and China going into a new Cold War, or that we're on our way to conflict, or the Thucydides Trap. We have the choice not to do that. We have the choice, instead, to move forward with what President Biden has called stiff competition. Where we are going to compete vigorously across multiple dimensions, including economics and technology. Where we're going to stand up for our values. But where we also recognize that China is going to be a factor in the international system for the foreseeable future - it's not going anywhere. And the United States is not going anywhere, and we're not going

[PM of Israel](#) Verified account @IsraeliPM

The weak crumble, are slaughtered and are erased from history while the strong, for good or for ill, survive. The strong are respected, and alliances are made with the strong, and in the end peace is made with the strong.

10:05 AM - 29 Aug 2018


## Macron dénonce «la loi du plus fort» à la tribune de l'ONU

Par [AFP](#) — 25 septembre 2018 à 22:49

« La deuxième voie, ce serait celle de la loi du plus fort. C'est la tentation pour chacun de suivre sa propre loi. Cette voie, je l'affirme ici, celle de l'unilatéralisme, elle nous conduit directement au repli et au conflit, à la confrontation généralisée de tous contre tous, au détriment de chacun, même de celui à terme qui se croit le plus fort. La responsabilité de la paix ne se délègue pas, ne se refuse pas, ne se préempte pas, elle s'exerce collectivement. La loi du plus fort ne protège aucun peuple contre quelque menace que ce soit, qu'elle soit chimique ou nucléaire »

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/welcome-to-the-jungle/2018/10/09/0f8ffb58-cbc5-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.e97dab5c4110](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/welcome-to-the-jungle/2018/10/09/0f8ffb58-cbc5-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html?utm_term=.e97dab5c4110)

**The great nations  
have always acted  
like gangsters, and  
the small nations  
like prostitutes.  
~Stanley Kubrick**





Hubert Védrine «  
*L'Europe est une sorte  
de paradis pour  
Bisounours , mais le  
monde c'est Jurassic  
Park !*

**Nous entrons dans  
une ère nouvelle, l'ère  
de l'hyper-  
compétitivité.**

Discours 15 septembre 2021 Strasbourg  
Discours sur l'état de l'Union 2021 de la  
présidente von der Leyen



**Sigmar Gabriel**, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères (RFA), lui, [avertit](#) : « **Dans un monde de carnivores géopolitiques, les Européens sont les derniers végétariens. Sans le Royaume-Uni, nous deviendrons vegans. Puis une proie (2010).** »

**Germany is a vegetarian in a world full of carnivores**  
German political debate is peculiarly parochial considering it is the leading power in Europe  
Financial Times, 9 septembre 2013


**The rise of herbivorous powers, ecf 14 oct 2007**

A global public opinion survey shows that there is growing public support for a more multi-polar world, and 35% of world citizens would like to see the EU's influence to grow.

Listen to a discussion of the poll results with Robert Kagan, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard

# 時局圖

Use of the “sleep” metaphor for nations or peoples—mostly China—in Chinese language articles contained in the database *Zhongguo jinxindai sixiang shi zhuanyeshujuku* 中國近現代思想史專業數據庫 for the years 1884-1920.



一目了然



不三



François Heisbourg

## Le Temps des prédateurs

La Chine, les États-Unis, la Russie et nous



[China "Asleep" and "Awakening." A Study in Conceptualizing Asymmetry and Coping with It.](#)

Rudolf G. Wagner, *Transcultural Studies*, 2011/1

WAKE-UP CALL



- 1/ La crise économique 2008sq
- 2/ Le choc russe (2014)
- 3/ Le choc des réfugiés (2014sq)
- 4/ Le choc terroriste (2015sq)
- 5/ Le choc du Brexit (referendum juin 2016)
- 6/ Le choc Trump (novembre 2016)
- 7/ Le choc de la puissance chinoise (investissements)
- 8/ Le choc sanitaire

En tant que fragment de discours politique, *l'Europe puissance* est donc une sorte de mythe utile : l'UE n'est pas et ne sera peut-être jamais une puissance dans tous les sens du terme, mais cette *Europe puissance* peut être un horizon, plus ou moins distant et fictif, dont l'énoncé permet de mobiliser des énergies et d'entamer des réformes

### **De quoi l'Europe puissance est-elle le nom ?**

29 octobre 2020

The Conversation

#### **EU Ambassadors' Conference 2020: "The EU needs to practice the language of power, not just speak it"**

Brussels, 13/11/2020 This afternoon, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, addressed EU ambassadors in the closing session of the 2020 EU Ambassadors' conference.

In his presentation, **Josep Borrell** said that in a competitive world, **the EU needs to 'practice the language of power, not just speak it'. Both wider political trends and the corona pandemic have required the strengthening of the EU as a political project, building a Union that acts and protects.**

The High Representative/Vice-President instructed EU Ambassadors to ensure an active EU in the global arena and to fly the EU flag and speak the EU's voice.

“En Chine - Le gâteau des Rois et... des Empereurs” Caricature politique française 1898







**China's moon rocks are officially on their way to Earth as Chang'e 5 probe leaves lunar orbit**

By [Andrew Jones](#) 14 dec 2020

The first lunar samples in 44 years are a few days away from Earth


<https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/affaires-etrangeres/affaires-etrangeres-emission-du-samedi-19-decembre-2020>





Nina Silove (2017):  
Beyond the  
Buzzword: The Three  
Meanings of “Grand  
Strategy”, *Security  
Studies*,

Comment préparer 2050 ?  
De la « prévoyance » à la « grande  
stratégie »  
Par **Martin Briens** et **Thomas  
Gomart**  
**Martin Briens** est diplomate.  
**Thomas Gomart** est directeur  
de l'Ifri.  
*Politique étrangère* 2021/4




Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski &  
Simon Reich (2019) Is Grand Strategy a  
Research Program? A Review Essay,  
*Security Studies*, 28:1, 58-86,


# New as well as some familiar faces in the "G20" of the future

(GDP, US\$ trn)

2020




2050



Source: EIU.

## La part des principales puissances dans le PIB mondial en 2019, 2040 et 2050

Part du PIB mondial




Sources : Commission européenne (2021) "Shaping & Securing the EU's open Strategic Autonomy by 2040 and beyond", p.16, à partir de Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE) (juillet 2018) "The long view: scenarios for the world economy to 2060, OECD Economic Policy Paper"

Conception et réalisation de la version originale en anglais : 2021, Commission européenne. Traduction et réalisation de la version en français : 2021, Charlotte Bezamat-Mantes.

Copyright pour la version en français : Charlotte Bezamat-Mantes/Diploweb.com, novembre 2021.



# Tipping towards Beijing



Source: IMF \*Imports and exports

**Watch China Overtake The US As The World's Major Trading Partner**  
January 27, 2020


<https://merchantmachine.co.uk/china-vs-us/>

## Who you gonna call?


Countries which share greater trade\* with:

■ United States ■ China ■ No data


2000†




2020†



% of global total



Graphique 4. Part mondiale des publications scientifiques des 20 premiers pays, %, 2005-18




www.hceres.fr/Rapport-PSF2021-Graphique-4

Source : Base OST, Web of Science, calculs OST


# Spill over technologies civiles / militaires

**Biden Faces a Steep Challenge to Unite Democracies on Tech**  
With tech policy, sorting the world into democratic and authoritarian buckets is far trickier than it sounds.



## THE TOP 10 MILITARY SPENDERS, 2020


Military expenditure by the top 10 countries reached \$1482 billion in 2020 and accounted for 75% of global military spending.




Notes: Spending figures are in current 2020 US\$ billion. The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement or acceptance by SIPRI.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Apr. 2021.

www.sipri.org  
© SIPRI 2021




## China-US Defence Spending Projections Under Various Assumptions\*



## How Military Spending Has Changed Since 2007

% change in military spending among major powers between 2007 and 2016



@StatistaCharts Source: Sipri via BBC


statista

## Les deux grandes omissions du budget de la défense chinois

BLOG - 8 Mars 2021

Matthieu Duchatel

<https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/les-deux-grandes-omissions-du-budget-de-la-defense-chinois>



## We will all go together when we go


Nuclear-capable delivery systems

Ground launchers

Submarine tubes

Bombers\*

Russia



Source: Federation Of American Scientists

United States



China



\*Dormant capability before 2017 in China

The Economist

## L'accélération du programme nucléaire chinois inquiète le Pentagone

Par [Mayeul Aldebert](#) Le Figaro 03/11/2021

«L'accélération de l'expansion nucléaire de la Chine pourrait lui permettre de disposer de 700 têtes nucléaires d'ici 2027», indique ce rapport annuel du ministère américain de la Défense sur les capacités militaires de la Chine. «Il est probable que Pékin cherche à se doter d'au moins 1000 têtes nucléaires d'ici 2030, ce qui est supérieur au rythme et au volume estimés en 2020».

From 1901 to 2021. It takes China 120 years to tell the US they don't have the qualification to speak to China "from a position of strength".



Chinese diplomats deal vigorous counterblows to condescending US representatives; common ground hard to reach on contrasting logics

By [Zhang Hui](#)

Global Times, Mar 19, 2021





## China overtakes U.S. in largest diplomatic network

Number of posts (as of November)

### Global ranking

1	China	276
2	U.S.	273
3	France	267
4	Japan	247
5	Russia	242
6	Turkey	234
7	Germany	224
8	Brazil	222
9	Spain	215
10	Italy	209
11	U.K.	205

### Asia ranking

1	China	276
2	Japan	247
3	India	186
4	South Korea	183
5	Indonesia	132
6	Pakistan	117
7	Malaysia	107
8	Taiwan	107
9	Thailand	98
10	Vietnam	96

Source: Lowy Institute

## Chinese Vaccine Handover Ceremonies

Countries in red held ceremonies attended by government officials to welcome the delivery of Chinese vaccines



CSIS

Source: CSIS China Power Project

<https://chinapower.csis.org/china-covid-medical-vaccine-diplomacy/>

@li\_xiaosi

· Jan 15


China's vaccine support to other countries is becoming action. The Presidents of Indonesia, Turkey, Seychelles and the Jordanian Prime Minister have been vaccinated against COVID-19 with Chinese vaccines, which demonstrates their trust in the safety of Chinese-made vaccine






## Chinese diplomats engage Facebook, Twitter


While both platforms are banned in China, Chinese diplomatic accounts have more than tripled on Twitter and more than doubled on Facebook since mid-2019.



## Sample of activity on 191 Chinese diplomatic accounts on Twitter



Source: Facebook, Twitter, NodeXL. Historical activity for some Twitter accounts may be underrepresented.



## China's Twitter diplomacy

151 Twitter accounts of Chinese diplomats as of July 2020\*  
(of which 113 accounts created since July 2019 / 61 accounts created since January 2020)



★ MFA HQ ★ UN New York ★ UN Geneva ★ UN Vienna ★ UN La Hague ★ European Union ★ ASEAN ★ African Union

\*Methodology: Twitter accounts from China's MoFA, Embassies, Ambassadors, Consulates, Consuls and Spokespersons as of July 31<sup>st</sup>, 2020. Accounts from Chinese diplomats of lower rank are excluded as well as accounts from the International Department of the CPC Central Committee.

@AntoineBondaz  
Made with Khartis

# Puissance et masculinité




January 2018



23 May 2018



TIME Magazine for its May 14, 2018 international edition.



[Sergey Radchenko @DrRadchenko](#)

Archival find of the day. In 1998 the top Russian lawmaker Yegor Stroyev made the following comment to a visiting Czech delegation: "**What happened to Russia in 1992? Russia was treated like a whore. Anyone could take her if he wanted to.** It won't happen again. Don't be offended."



<http://www.realhistorychannel.org/169965944-macho-putin-vs-girly-boy-obama.pdf>

### The Remasculinization of Russia?

*Gender, Nationalism, and the Legitimation of Power Under*

*Vladimir Putin, Oleg Riabov et Tatiana Riabova, Problems of Post-Communism; Printemps 2014*

**"I am not a woman, so I don't have bad days," (Putin)**



“A broader lesson from French interventionism is: **beware of mistaken perceptions of weakness.** Modern Western countries are often seen as feeble and casualty- adverse, especially in times of economic crisis and war fatigue, or when they refrain from supporting some of their traditional clients.

The recent French interventionism is proof to the contrary. Jihadist forces and other potential Western foes such as China, North Korea, or Iran bank on our alleged weakness at their own peril”

Bruno Tertrais, *Leading on the Cheap? French Security Policy in Austerity*, *The Washington Quarterly*, 36(3), 2013







© Obtained by DailyMail.com



the 1970s...





President Donald Trump told a cheering crowd at a campaign rally that there was once tough talk "back and forth" between him and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un "and then we fell in love."

Trump said at the Saturday night rally in West Virginia: "He wrote me beautiful letters and they're great letters. We fell in love." (30/3/2018)





**Hong Kong protesters wave 'Swole Trump' posters at Thanksgiving rally WP 29 nov 2019**

Pro-democracy protesters in central Hong Kong celebrated U.S. lawmakers and President Trump on Thursday night, thanking them for [passing and enacting legislation](#) that promises to punish officials who restrict freedoms in the territory.

Of the thousands at the “Thanksgiving Rally,” many draped themselves in American flags and sang “The Star-Spangled Banner,” and some lauded Trump as an international hero by waving posters depicting a strong, shirtless American leader.

The “Swole Trump” image — the president’s face superimposed on the body of Sylvester Stallone as fictional boxing champion Rocky Balboa — circulated on the pro-Trump Internet even before his [Twitter account posted](#) the picture Wednesday, the day before Thanksgiving.

# US-China relations: who's the alpha male? America's friends and allies are watching closely

- If America wants to repair its regional alliances, it must first show it can deal with Beijing from a position of strength
- Small and medium-sized nations need assurances that they won't be used merely as a tool to counter China, to be discarded the moment it suits the US to compromise with Beijing

SCMP, 24 fev 2021



## A 'Masculinity Crisis'? China Says the Boys Are Not All Right

The Education Ministry plans to beef up gym classes after a top official said female teachers and pop culture had made boys "weak, inferior and timid."

NYT 5 février 2021

In the latest attempt to tackle what academics and news outlets call a "masculinity crisis," the Education Ministry has proposed emphasizing the "spirit of yang," or male attributes, by hiring more sports instructors and redesigning physical education classes in elementary and secondary schools.

The plan, a response to a top official's call to "prevent the feminization of male youths," was released last week. It included no timeline and few other details, but it prompted an outcry online and is still stirring fierce debate on social media. One hashtag has been viewed 1.5 billion times on Weibo, a popular microblogging platform

## Chinese Government's Push for Masculinity Targets Boy Bands, Online Influencers

By: [John S. Van Oudenaren](#)

China Brief, November 5, 2021

The regulation directs media outlets to “resolutely reject persons who violate laws and morality” including those who exhibit “abnormal aesthetics” (畸形审美, *jixing shenmei*) ([NRTA](#), September 2; [China Law Translate](#), September 2). The notice offers only one example of “abnormal aesthetics”- “niangpao” (娘炮) literally “girlie gun”, derogatory cyberslang for men who do not display a traditional masculine aesthetic (sometimes translated as “sissy” or “girlie man”, see [UPenn Language Log](#)). Chinese broadcasters, online media outlets and individual performers quickly conformed to the NRTA’s guidance. For example, singer songwriter Cai Xukun (蔡徐坤) commonly known as “KUN” did a photoshoot where he swapped his trademark eyeliner and dyed hair for a manbun and a muscle shirt. The style change earned KUN praise in online media for looking “more masculine” and working to change his “negative image” as someone with a “girly” (娘, *niang*) style ([Netease](#), September 16).

In addition to banning “niang pao” from media platforms, state public morality propaganda has also charged “effeminate men” with weakening the nation. In a March 2021 interview with *Beijing Youth Daily*, Zhang Shuhua, an expert of at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference lamented that popular entertainment is filled with men wearing makeup or “小鲜肉”(xiao yangrou)-internet slang for handsome but effeminate men, which damages the “national spirit” ([UCASS](#), March 11) Zhang asserts that as the international environment is increasingly dominated by competition between civilizations and nations, China must produce young people who are “sober, firm-willed, physically strong, and full of masculine vigor.” Zhang expressed support for the Ministry of Education’s proposal to “Prevent the Feminization of Male Adolescents,” stating “boys must be masculine” (男孩子就要阳刚, *nanhaizi jiu yao yanggang*). Zhang raises three concerns over the “feminizing” influence of contemporary culture: 1) it conveys the wrong aesthetics and values; 2) it leads to “degeneration of the socialist spirit” and saps willingness of Chinese youth to defend the motherland; and 3) it could foster a “deformed view of marriage and love, which will lower the birthrate, alter the population structure, and cast a shadow over the country’s future.”

**Chinese state media also promotes the conspiracy theory that feminine styles catching on among Chinese males is actually a product of influence operations undertaken by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency**

Forbes Apr 13, 2020,08:27am EDT

# What Do Countries With The Best Coronavirus Responses Have In Common? Women Leaders



Cahier numéro un de l'édition n° 2903 du 25 juin au 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 2020

**LE SYSTÈME RAOULT** P.48 || **LE CHASSEUR DE FAUX GAUGUIN** P.80

APR. CFA 3000 F. PPA. AIG. 400 DA. ALL. 5.000 €. AND. 5.500 €. AUT. 5.000 €. BELG. 5.300 €. CAN. 6.000 \$CAN. DEM. 5.000 €. ESP. 5.500 €. GR. 4.500 €. GREC. 5.500 €. HON. 5.500 €. IRL. 5.500 €. JAP. 6.000 ¥. KOR. 6.000 ₩. LUX. 6.000 €. MAR. 45 DH. PAYS BAS. 5.500 €. PORT. 5.500 €. SUI. 7.200 CHF. TOM. 550 K¥. T. 1.000 €. U.S. 6.000 \$

# L'OBSS

## LES FONCEUSES

*Comment elles relancent l'Europe* P.30

ANGELA MERKEL | URSULA VON DER LEYEN | CHRISTINE LAGARDE

M 02228 - 2903 - F: 4,90 €

© 2020 PHOTOGRAPHIE: JONAS KRUMHOLTZ/GETTY IMAGES - JONAS KRUMHOLTZ/GETTY IMAGES - JONAS KRUMHOLTZ/GETTY IMAGES

# UN « TOURNANT » MONDIAL AU DEBUT DES ANNEES 2010s?

2007: discours de Poutine conférence de Munich (+ Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007)),

2008: début de la crise financière puis économique, USA, UE. JO de Pékin (profil bas/les réussir. Guerre en Géorgie,

2009/ Pékin présente à l’ONU sa carte de la Mer de Chine S avec sa ligne des 9 points; 2010: La Chine fait de la Mer de Chine un « core interest »

2009 Netanyahu de retour au pouvoir

**2011: intervention occidentale en Libye** (équivalent de l’intervention italienne en Libye en 1911?)

**2012** Poutine de retour à la présidence de la Russie, refuse de rencontrer Obama et d’aller au G8

Xi Jinping Secrétaire Général du PCC. Oct début amitié Putin –Xi (lors du sommet APEC). Juin, Chinois prennent Scarborough Shoal (au large des Philippines, sans réactions US)

Shinzo Abe retrouve le poste de Premier Ministre du Japon (occupé un an 2006-2007). L’Etat japonais achète une grande partie des Senkaku (préemptant Shintaro Ishihara gouverneur de Tokyo)

Pressions israéliennes pour bombardier l’Iran

Escalade de la guerre en Syrie. « contre-révolutions arabes après les espoirs de 2011

**2013**

Janvier 2013 intervention française au Mali (Serval)

Chine lance sa Belt & Road Initiative

Août 2013; Obama n’intervient pas après l’utilisation de gaz en Syrie, déclarée comme ligne rouge

Début de la crise ukrainienne

## **2014**

Déclaration d'indépendance puis annexion de la Crimée. Discours sur la « Nouvelle Guerre Froide ». Pivot russe vers l'Asie

Premières victoires foudroyantes de l'Etat Islamique (Daech), notamment la prise de Mossoul

Tensions en Mer de Chine du Sud, politique assertive de la Chine qui a déjà en 2013 déclaré une ADIZ, au détriment du Japon et de la Corée du S

Le Nationaliste Narendra Modi devient Premier Ministre de l'Inde

## **2015**

Incidents Russie/OTAN dans la Baltique

Intervention dirigée par l'Arabie Saoudite au Yémen (Tempête décisive), Accroissement des tensions Arabie Saoudite/Iran

« Crise » migratoire en Europe

Netanyahu réélu et renforcé en Israël, critique l'accord sur l'Iran

Intervention militaire russe en Syrie, tensions avec la Turquie (avion russe abattu)

Terrorisme à Paris (janvier, novembre)

Réforme de Shinzo Abe sur les questions stratégiques

**2016 :**

1/ la sortie programmée du Royaume-Uni de l'Union européenne suite à un référendum populaire,  
2/ la tentative ratée de coup d'Etat en Turquie,  
3/ l'élection du milliardaire Donald Trump à la présidence des Etats-Unis

4/ la chute d'Alep en Syrie.

5/ Changement de ton de la diplomatie chinoise  
une impression de « pire année de tous les temps » (1)


**+ A. CARTER COMPETITION ENTRE GRANDES PUISSANCES**

(1) Jia Tolentino, « The worst year ever, until next year », *The New Yorker*, 14 dec. 2016.


<http://www.afri-ct.org/2018/mise-en-ligne-integrale-de-lafri-2017/>



## Doomsday clock: Minutes away from midnight (1947-2015)



## Doomsday clock extremes




SOURCE: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

**This is your COVID wake-up call:**  
**It is 100 seconds to midnight**  
 2021 Doomsday Clock Statement  
[Science and Security Board](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/)  
 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

<https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/>




## Dépenses militaires par région (de 1988 à 2020, en milliards de dollars constants de 2019)



Données manquantes pour 1991. Les données avant 2004 n'incluent pas l'Irak. Les données de 2015 à 2020 pour le Moyen-Orient sont estimées à partir du total mondial.

SOURCES : "NEW STATESMAN", SIPRI


Figure 5 – Change in major global actors' military spending in the past decade



Source: IISS Military Balance [2021](#) and 2011.

## Guns or butter?

Military spending, % of GDP, 2019



Source: SIPRI

The Economist

## We will all go together when we go

Nuclear-capable delivery systems

Ground launchers

Submarine tubes

Bombers\*

Russia



Source: Federation Of American Scientists


United States



China



\*Dormant capability before 2017 in China



Present at the Destruction  
(Mark Leonard 1/10/2018,  
head, ECFR)

**The task ahead for the remaining multilateralists is to avoid becoming guardians of a *status quo* that is already dead.** That will require carefully identifying the weak spots of the existing order, and forging coalitions of the willing to address them

**Strongmen will continue to reign. As geopolitical competition heats up, voters will turn to tough leaders whom they trust to uphold narrow national interests.** But this lurch toward centralized decision-making will produce inconsistent and radical policies, along with perpetual cheating. Without an empowered multilateral system to police abuses, countries governed by strongmen will increasingly break their promises, lie, and peddle conspiracy theories – Trump's *modus operandi*.

[https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_present\\_at\\_the\\_destruction](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_present_at_the_destruction)

# Present at the Re-creation?

U.S. Foreign Policy  
Must Be  
Remade, Not  
Restored  
*Jessica T. Mathews*  
*Foreign Affairs,*  
*Janvier-fev 2021*

what Biden regularly calls “the power of our example” is nothing like what it used to be. When it comes to the pillars of a law-abiding democracy, the United States is now more an example of what to avoid than of what to embrace. The country retains military primacy and the economic heft to impose sanctions, but the former has limited utility, and the latter are seldom effective when wielded unilaterally. To achieve its ends, Washington will have to heal at home—a long, slow process—while it rebuilds its power to persuade. As secretary of state, Antony Blinken will likely lead an important effort to rebuild morale and effectiveness within the country’s diplomatic corps, luring back talented professionals who fled Trump’s chaos, broadening recruitment, pursuing reforms to make the department’s work more efficient and creative, and appointing diplomatic veterans to key posts at home and abroad. But such steps will take a long time to make a difference. Meanwhile, Biden’s team may be seriously overestimating the leverage that the United States retains for initiatives that depend on its example, such as the global summits the president wants to convene on climate change and renewing democracy.

A good deal of what can be accomplished will depend on whether would-be Trump successors in the Senate make a return to “America first” policies a main thrust of their public postures. And although the various expert views on foreign policy do not line up exactly with the differences between the two political parties, the country’s deep polarization and the almost even partisan representation in Congress mean that nearly every policy shift will be a political battle. Meanwhile, public opinion is divided. In 2016, the last time the Pew Research Center [asked](#) Americans to describe their country’s global role “in terms of solving world problems,” 41 percent of respondents said the United States did “too much,” 27 percent said “too little,” and 28 percent said the United States did “the right amount.” Decades ago, the U.S. diplomat Harlan Cleveland was fond of saying that what Washington needed was “postwar thinking without the war.” That remains true—but is unlikely in the present environment

**Jake Sullivan on Asia**

**Hillary Clinton's top foreign policy official discusses the continent's challenges, 2016**

**Reprend cela à 2021**

architecture we're trying to build today. From the architecture that **Dean Acheson** was trying to build. In his time, it was sort of like the Parthenon with the big firm columns of the UN and NATO and the IMF and the World Bank, global organizations - formal, legal, universal. Today, it's much more flexible, ad hoc, more political than legal, sometimes more temporary than permanent. And in that sense, it's got more of a Frank Gehry character than the formal Greek architecture of the post-war era. It also means it's less satisfying, you don't just build it and it sits there kind of unmoved for decades or centuries. It's

That post-World-War II order, Sullivan argued, had been “like the Parthenon,” with columns that included the United Nations, NATO, and the various Bretton Woods institutions. Now? “We’re entering a phase of the **Frank Gehry** international order,” he said, referring to the architect known for his complicated designs. “It’s not clean lines. It’s surprising, it’s sometimes formal and sometimes informal, sometimes linear and sometimes ad hoc, sometimes shiny and sometimes not. That is hard for people who grew up with a certain view of how rules and institutions are supposed to operate.”



# Ne vit-on pas LE PIRE « en même temps »?

- Le retour à la multipolarité (qui aurait donné 1914 et 1939): globale  
- , régionale (MO, EO....), crise des « alliances » (US-UE), US unilatéralistes ds  
Un monde multipolaire après avoir été unilatéralistes ds un monde  
unipolaire (Bush Jr) puis multilatéralistes ds un monde multipolaire (Obama)
- Le retour à la bipolarité (ou à des « guerres froides »): US/Russie, US/Chine,  
voire US/Russie + Chine comme dans les années 1950s)
- Les restes d'unipolarité US justifiant frustrations & nuisances  
(+ dynamiques d'insécurité impériale aux marges + risque surexpansion de  
l'Empire global + réaction militaire au déclin)
- L'apolarité ou zéropolarité (cf L. Fabius), le monde sans sheriff  
(discours des néocons: Empire US ou chaos)
- La transition hégémonique: La Chine est-elle pour les  
US l'All pour le RU? Est-elle les US pour le RU (transition  
« pacifique » mais au pris de 2 guerres mondiales)



L'affirmation des puissances du MO (système « pénétré », appel d'empire et acteurs globalisés), l'impossibilité de l'hégémonie américaine, le « retour » de la Russie et l'« arrivée » de la Chine

Israël

L'Iran

La Turquie


L'Arabie Saoudite, les EAU, le Qatar



De la Corne de l'Afrique à l'Afghanistan, en passant par la Libye, la Syrie ou le Caucase....




Midsized mayhem  
Why medium-sized autocracies  
are projecting more hard power  
abroad  
And why this is alarming


The Economist 27 nov 2021







(mais Israël pas neutre du tout!)



<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/deals-drones-and-national-will-new-era-turkish-power-projection>  
 Turkey's Overseas Military Partnerships and Base




*Routledge Studies in African Politics and International Relations*

## TURKEY IN AFRICA

A NEW EMERGING POWER?

Edited by  
 Elem Eyryce Tepeciklioğlu  
 and Ali Onur Tepeciklioğlu



*Rethinking Asia and International Relations*


## TURKEY'S PIVOT TO EURASIA

GEOPOLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN  
 A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

Edited by  
 Emre Ergen and Seçkin Kösterm





# Military presence




# Présence militaire turque











<https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/sizing-up-little-sparta-understanding-uae-military-effectiveness/>

## **UAE resets a decade of muscular foreign policy**

Officials pivot from robust intervention after coronavirus pandemic

hit Gulf state's economy

FT 8 juin 2021


For a decade, the United Arab Emirates has been the Arab world's most muscular regional actor, deploying its petrodollar wealth and military power to bolster allies and weaken foes.

After the revolts reverberated across the Middle East, the UAE sought to impose its vision on the region, with Sheikh Mohammed convinced that his state had to fill a perceived vacuum of US indifference and take the lead in preventing the rise of Islamist movements and countering Iran's influence. The aggressive approach led to the UAE's deploying thousands of troops to the war in Yemen as it became Saudi Arabia's main partner in an Arab coalition that intervened in the conflict in 2015 to fight Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.

It has also been one of the main supporters of Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. And in 2017, Abu Dhabi was at the forefront of a regional embargo on Qatar, which the UAE and Saudi Arabia imposed after accusing Doha of supporting Islamists and being too close to Iran. The interventions raised the profile and influence of Abu Dhabi, as the small, oil-rich nation — an important partner of the west — punched above its weight. But none ended with great success and all inflicted reputational damage on the UAE.

In Yemen, Abu Dhabi won Washington's plaudits for its campaign against al-Qaeda militants. But the Saudi-led coalition failed to dislodge the Houthis and the UAE withdrew most of its troops in 2019 as regional tensions with Iran escalated and criticism mounted of a war that triggered a humanitarian disaster. In Libya, Haftar suffered a series of defeats last year after Turkey — the UAE's arch-rival — intervened militarily to support Libya's UN-backed government and ended the warlord's more than year-long offensive against Tripoli. Western diplomats say the UAE has in recent months withdrawn its military assets from Libya. In January, Abu Dhabi followed Saudi Arabia's lead in lifting the regional embargo on Qatar.

# L'influence iranienne au Moyen-Orient




# Iran's relations in the Middle East

Diplomatic ties and interventions



# Iranian ballistic missile ranges and bases

As of April 2021



Source: IISS Project Atlas

©IISS


# Iranian Navy's Port Visits and Joint Naval Exercises



# ISRAEL

## Military imports and exports

From 1950 to 2020, **83** of Israel's arms imports came from the US and **23** percent of its exports went to India.



### Israel Imports



### Israel Exports



## Abraham Accords Launch a New Era in Middle East /North Africa Trade Relations






FIGURE 1  
Top Foreign Military Financing Recipients Since FY2001



Source: SIPRI | Data as of 2020

# The Horn of Africa

Race to build commercial and military footholds




Commercial or military ports planned or under construction by:

- Turkey
- United Arab Emirates
- Japan
- Qatar
- France
- US
- Italy
- China

Sources: Brookings; FT research

maps4news.com/©HERE

# Présence étrangère en Libye



## Présence étrangère

- ▬ Russie
- ▬ Emirats arabes unis
- ▬ Turquie


## Zones de contrôle

- ▬ GNA (*forces pro-gouvernementale*)
- ▬ ANL (*forces pro-Haftar*)
- ▬ Groupes armés Touaregs
- ▬ Groupes armés Amazighs (*groupes armés locaux*)
- ▬ Groupes armés Toubous

SOURCE : FRS - AU 5/07/2020

L'Opinion, 29 Juillet 2020


# L'Est méditerranéen, un enjeu international



- Limite des 6 milles nautiques grecs
- Eaux territoriales grecques (12 milles nautiques)
- Eaux territoriales turques (12 milles nautiques)
- Eaux territoriales chypriotes (12 milles nautiques)
- Eaux territoriales autres (12 milles nautiques)
- Limite de la zone économique exclusive (200 milles nautiques)
- ZEE revendiquée par la Turquie
- Concessions pour des explorations gazières accordées par... la Turquie
- Concessions pour des explorations gazières accordées par... la Rép. turque de Chypre du Nord (non reconnue par la communauté internationale)

SOURCES : MARINEREGIONS.ORG ; ANADOLU

## Les nouvelles lignes de front





Sources : Onu, Geopolitical Atlas of Ocean (Technip), AFP, IENE, Middle East Economic Survey. Infographie : Hervé Bouilly

# China's Digital Silk Road in the Middle East

## Chinese Tech **Supercharging** Innovation Drive in the Gulf


Sources: Australian Strategic Policy Institute; TeleGeography.

Note: Icons denote countries that have agreement(s) with Chinese companies.





# Attendance of "Africa+1" Summits by African Leaders



SOURCE: Carnegie Africa Program's analysis based on government and the African Union websites, and various news sources.

NOTE: \*Estimated attendance numbers.

\*\*Attendance numbers are drawn from the 2018 FOCAC because the 2021 edition of the summit is at the ministerial level.

# Etats-Unis – Chine: la nouvelle structuration du monde?



L'ASIE DU XXI ÈME SIECLE  
RESSEMBLE-T-ELLE  
A L'EUROPE D'AVANT 1914  
?

PIERRE GROSSER

*Course aux armements  
Nationalismes (top down &  
bottom up)  
Enjeux territoriaux +  
« flashpoints » (Taiwan  
Corée du Nord...)  
Défi du déclin de l'hégemon*

<https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01064752/document>

# WINNING THE THIRD WORLD

SINO-AMERICAN RIVALRY DURING THE COLD WAR




**GREGG A. BRAZINSKY**

Author of *Nation Building in South Korea*




Mais la Chine n'est pas obsédée par l'idée de la 1ère place

Notre ministère des AF a déclaré aujourd'hui : « L'objectif de la Chine n'a jamais été de surpasser les États-Unis, mais de se surpasser. »




A screenshot of a tweet from USA TODAY Politics (@usatodayDC). The tweet text reads: "President Biden on China: 'They have an overall goal to become the leading country in the world, the wealthiest country in the world and the most powerful country in the world. That's not going to happen on my watch.'" Below the text is a video thumbnail showing President Joe Biden speaking at a news conference. The video has 74.8K views and a caption that says "Biden says China won't surpass US as global power on his watch". The tweet is from the account @usatodayDC, verified, and is categorized under POLITICS.





N° 2535 - 18 Mars 2021



[January/February 2021](#)




March/April 2021

Two covers of [@TheEconomist](#): October 25, 1997 vs. October 20, 2018



July 1, 1997 cover



18 mai 2019

## Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China

### [Foreign Policy](#)

Issued on: October 4, 2018

Hudson Institute

More broadly, the vice president's speech was not a search for off-ramps or for lowering tensions, but rather a message of America's determination to elevate pressure until Beijing accepts the bilateral relationship, as Washington envisions it. It also signaled that the White House does not believe a de-escalation on trade is achievable or desirable in the near term. If it did, Vice President Pence would not have injected a depth charge into the relationship now, just weeks prior to an expected meeting between President Trump and President Xi on the margins of the G-20 meeting.

Washington clearly wanted to convey that it is comfortable with elevated bilateral tensions, and if Beijing is not, then the ball is in China's court to come up with fixes to existing problems. For reasons cited above, Beijing is unlikely to do so. Beijing likely will interpret Pence's speech as validation that the Trump administration seeks to keep China down, and that concessions and compromise only would invite additional American pressure.

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/04/who-was-mike-pence-really-addressing-in-his-speech-on-china/>

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/>

Pence's speech represents the most comprehensive and well-articulated narrative of the Trump administration on US-China relations. It should not just be a short-term tactic aimed at the upcoming midterm and 2020 presidential elections, as much of China's state media have claimed, but **a major policy document that turns a new page in history. It is consistent with several recent Trump administration policy documents, which define China as a main rival that seeks to undermine the US economy and its interests and values**

<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2168281/fighting-talk-its-washington-vs-beijing-after-us-vp-mike>

### **Mike Pence Announces Cold War II**

**The administration is orchestrating a far-reaching campaign against China.**

**Walter Russel Mead, 8 octobre 2018**

**Wall Street Journal**

Texte et commentaires: Pierre Grosser

<https://legrandcontinent.eu/2018/12/09/la-grande-peur/>

[Professor Anne-Marie Brady](#)

[@Anne MarieBrady](#)

Since 2009 the CCP has invested billions in shaping a positive global image 大外宣. China-critical commentary is framed as: China threat 中国威胁论, Cold War thinking 冷战思想, anti-China 反华, demonising China 中国妖魔化, McCarthyism 麦卡锡主义, xenophobia 排外主义.

## Chinese Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy



**Short Definition:**  
A new approach of Chinese diplomacy from conservative, passive, and low-key to assertive, proactive, and high-profile diplomacy.

### The background of "wolf-warrior diplomacy" term

*Wolf Warrior* and *Wolf Warrior II* are Chinese action blockbusters that highlight agents of Chinese special operation forces. They have boosted national pride and patriotism among Chinese viewers. "Wolf-warrior diplomacy." named after these movies.




In late 2019, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the country's envoys to be more assertive in representing Beijing's interests overseas and vocal in defending the Chinese Communist government from criticism and he instructed them to display a much stronger "fighting spirit."

Western officials and analysts say this is a coordinated campaign lauding President Xi Jinping and used as "counter-measures" against critical foreign governments.

Source: *The Diplomat*, VOA News, IMDb



# ARTICLES WITH "ANTI-CHINA" IN THE *PEOPLE'S DAILY* FROM 2013 TO 2020



<https://sinocism.com/p/chinas-political-discourse-in-2020>



庆祝中国共产党成立100周年  
The 100th Anniversary of the Founding of  
The Communist Party of China

“

**We have never bullied, oppressed, or subjugated the people of any other country, and we never will. By the same token, we will never allow any foreign force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.**

*-Xi Jinping*

General secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee,  
Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission

Rebel Pepper  
©RFA. 10.08.19.





## China's nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?

### The new Pentagon report reveals China's worries about U.S. missile defenses.

Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, WP 11/11 2021

The Defense Department's annual report on [China's military power](#) assessed that [its nuclear arsenal](#) could quadruple by 2030. Last week's report also confirmed that China is building three missile-silo fields, which analysts expect to account for a significant increase in the projected warhead stockpile.

China is modernizing, diversifying and expanding its nuclear force

The most likely reason behind China's changing nuclear force structure reflects Beijing's attempts to remove any doubts in the minds of other nuclear powers that it can retaliate for a nuclear attack, especially in the face of U.S. [nuclear modernization plans](#).

China has long worried about the survivability of its small force for two main reasons. The first is U.S. offensive nuclear capabilities, which give it the ability to find and attack China's nuclear forces.


The second relates to U.S. missile defenses

a larger nuclear arsenal might boost China's chances of deterring the United States from any kind of nuclear use — but also increase China's confidence about deploying its conventional capabilities. This is what scholars call the [“stability-instability” paradox](#): When adversaries worry less about a conflict going nuclear because their nuclear arsenals are stalemated, they're more likely to start nonnuclear conflicts.

Our earlier research has [showed](#) that Chinese experts appeared confident that a U.S.-China conflict wouldn't go nuclear. But the rapid deterioration of political relations with the United States has almost certainly shaken that confidence.

China's expanding arsenal will pose challenges to the U.S. nuclear posture, forcing the U.S. to plan to deter both Russia's and now China's large and sophisticated arsenal. How this new nuclear environment affects U.S. nuclear modernization plans and future strategic arms control with Russia will depend on whether planners decide the U.S. could face major conflicts with both rivals at once or in quick succession. And how U.S. allies view the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrence guarantees will also be a factor.


# NATIONAL REVIEW





WHY THE U.S.  
SHOULD BE  
A SEA POWER  
AGAIN

JERRY HENDRIX

Total battle force ships, US Navy and Chinese PLA Navy  
(totals past 2020 are estimates)







# politique étrangère

Indo-Pacifique :  
un concept flottant ?  
*Peut-on stabiliser le Sahel ?*



Automne 2019



ÉDITIONS ATELIER 24  
L 17569 - S3 - F. 10,95 € - RD  




# Asia's Democratic Security Diamond

Dec 27, 2012 | SHINZO ABE

*Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest seafaring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role – alongside Australia, India, and the US – in preserving the common good in both regions.*



## Joint Statement from Quad Leaders

September 24, 2021 •

We, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, convened today in person as “the Quad” for the first time. On this historic occasion we recommit to our partnership, and to a region that is a bedrock of our shared security and prosperity—a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is also inclusive and resilient

# Current boundaries



## Pierre Grosser: Tensions à la frontière sino-indienne : comprendre la crise à la bonne échelle

<https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2020/06/24/frontiere-sino-indienne/>



BOARD EXAM  
BLUES

COVID-19: DEALING  
WITH THE SURGE


SUSHANT SINGH RAJPUT:  
A STAR SNUFFED OUT

www.indiatoday.in



# INDIA TODAY

JUNE 29, 2020 ₹50



## TAKING ON CHINA

INDIA'S OPTIONS

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: NITIN GADKARI  
WE CAN CAPITALISE ON WORLD'S WARINESS OF CHINA

JOURNALISM WITH A HUMAN TOUCH | www.theweek.in | TheWeekMag | TheWeekLive | ₹50

# THE WEEK

JUNE 29, 2020

HONG KONG  
FREEDOMS DISAPPEAR,  
UNCERTAINTY LOOMS

D.K. SHIVAKUMAR  
READY TO REBOOT THE  
CONGRESS IN KARNATAKA

RAHUL DRAVID EXCLUSIVE  
HOPE THE TRAINING  
SEASON ISN'T WIPED OUT




## ENEMY NUMBER 1

India can match an  
aggressive China on  
ground, but is there  
political will?

[@ConstantinoX](#)

·juin 2020  
Indian mood  
about China?  
Cover page of the  
two largest  
English-language  
weeklies.



# The Taliban Takeover of Kabul and Implications for the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Transit Corridor

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 147

By: [Vali Kaleji](#)

Jamestown, September 28, 2021







**Nato to expand focus to counter rising China**  
Secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg reveals significant broadening of alliance's objectives to include Beijing

FT 18 oct 2021


**Biden sets up Quad and Nato in pincer to counter China**

**PRESENCE DE L'INDE DE L'AUTRALIE ET DU JAPON AU SOMMET DE L'OTAN DE JUIN 2022 EN ITALIE?**

La diplomatie russe évoque les risques que représente le pacte AUKUS pour la sécurité internationale  
[SPUTNIK, 07:04 23.10.2021](https://www.sputnik.com/news/2021/10/23/1992177412/la-diplomatie-russe-voque-les-risques-que-represente-le-pacte-ukus-pour-la-securite-internationale/)

# Picking and choosing

Countries invited to Summit for Democracy, by democratic status\*



Sources: Freedom House; US State Department

\*According to Freedom House's democracy index, 2021



## Comparison of election systems between China and the US

### Voter turnout



**China**  
90%

Since the reform and opening-up, China has held 12 direct elections for deputies to the people's congress at the township level and 11 elections at the county level, and the turnout has been maintained at about 90%.

**US**  
66.3%

66.3% of eligible Americans cast ballots in the 2020 election.



**China**

There are deputies to the people's congress in every region, every industry, every field and every ethnic group.

**US**

The US politicians represent interest groups instead of the interests of the majority of voters and the country as a whole.

### Sources of election funds

**China**

The election expenses of people's congress deputies are appropriated by the state treasury, which effectively ensures that money cannot interfere with the election.

**US**

Self-funded, including political contribution



**China**

People's congress deputies are subject to strict and effective supervision during their term of office, and the law stipulates the rights and procedures for removal.

**US**

Once elected, there is almost no system or institutional arrangement under the supervision of voters to remove lawmakers during their term of office.

### Satisfaction rate

**China**  
93%

A report by Harvard University based on its survey in China spanning 13 years shows that the Chinese people's overall satisfaction toward the central government exceeds 93%.

**US**  
65.1%

Citizen satisfaction with federal government services plummeted to 65.1 (out of 100) in 2020, the lowest level since 2015, according to ACS1 Federal Government Report 2020.

**Conclusion: Chinese democracy is more extensive, more genuine and more effective than American democracy**



# The Summit for Socialist Democracy

Date: **Saturday 11 December**  
Time: 1400 Britain / 0900 US Eastern / 2200 China  
Location: Zoom / YouTube



**Cheng Enfu**  
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences



**Luna Oi**  
Blogger and broadcaster, Vietnam



**Carlos Ron**  
Simon Bolívar Institute, Venezuela



**Kiyul Chung**  
Tsinghua University, China



**Isabel Monal Rodríguez**  
Cuban Academy of Sciences



**Elias Jabbour**  
Rio de Janeiro State University, Brazil



**Layla Brown**  
AAPRP-GC / Northeastern University



**Roland Boer**  
Dalian University of Technology, China



**Danny Haiphong**  
Friends of Socialist China



**Radhika Desai**  
International Manifesto Group



**Ju-Hyun Park**  
Nodutdol

On December 9-10, US President Biden is hosting a Summit for Democracy, in order to "set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal" and to "defend against authoritarianism". The geopolitical theme of this is to unite the imperialist countries and their allies against China, Cuba, the DPRK, Vietnam, Laos, Russia, Iran, Venezuela and other countries. The ideological theme is to reaffirm the superiority of capitalism, neoliberalism and so-called liberal democracy.

The **Summit for Socialist Democracy**, organized jointly by **Friends of Socialist China** and the **International Manifesto Group**, will challenge the dominant narratives around democracy, will highlight the democratic systems prevailing in socialist societies, will discuss the plutocratic nature of neoliberal capitalism, and will expose how the concept of democracy is leveraged in support of a deeply undemocratic and violent imperialism.

[socialistchina.org](http://socialistchina.org) [internationalmanifesto.org](http://internationalmanifesto.org)



[@globaltimesnews](https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews)

[China state-affiliated media](https://www.globaltimesnews.com)

China released a white paper titled "China: Democracy That Works" at 10 am on Saturday during a press conference of the State Council Information Office. Under the leadership of the CPC, China has achieved a whole-process people's democracy.



## Le retour à une alliance sino-russe ?



# CHINA AND RUSSIA

THE NEW RAPPROCHEMENT



ALEXANDER  
LUKIN

## Xi Jinping's Foreign Visits (2013-2020)

Countries	Number of Visits
Russia	8
United States	4
France, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, South Africa	3
Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Spain, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam	2
53 other countries	1

Source: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<https://theconversation.com/passes-et-futur-du-pivot-asiatique-de-la-russie-69928>

### Russia and China: A Mutually Exaggerated Strategic Partnership?

Publication: China Brief Volume: 21 Issue: 20

By: [Pavel K. Baev](#)

October 22, 2021



Russia, China not trying to form any closed military alliance: Putin  
CGTN 22-Oct-2021

**Russia-China relations are "not directed against anyone," and are in the interests of both countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared on Thursday in Sochi.**

**"We have talked about this many times. We are friends with China in mutual interest, and [our relations] are not directed against anyone,"** the president said at the plenary session of the 18th annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, a Russian think tank.

"Unlike NATO countries, we are not trying to form any closed military alliance; there is no military bloc between Russia and China. We have no such intention," he added.

The remarks were echoed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on Friday.

China and Russia are more than allies, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin at a press conference. China is willing to work with Russia and the international community to promote new relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice and cooperation, Wang said.




Spokesperson发言人办公室

@MFA\_China

China government official

The [#China](#)-[#Russia](#) relationship is not an alliance, but better than alliances.




15.27 · 22.10.2021 · [Twitter Web App](#)

# 世界地势图

[@kwang\\_poon](#)

This world map reflects the centrality of the [#IndianOcean](#) in the eyes of China. [@Rory\\_Medcalf](#) of [@LowyInstitute](#) and [@NSC ANU](#) regards the [#MaritimeSilkRoutes](#) as the Chinese perspective on the [#IndoPacific](#).



projection cartographique polyconique de Xao Xiaoguang

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2167522/which-chinese-hold-top-jobs-key-international-bodies>

**Liu Zhenmin, undersecretary general for economic and social affairs at the United Nations**

**Zhang Tao, deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund**

**Yi Xiaozhun, deputy director general of the World Trade Organisation**

**Liu Fang, secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organisation**

**Zhao Houlin, secretary general of the International Telecommunication Union**

**Xue Hanqin, vice-president of the International Court of Justice**

Meng Hongwei's detention and resignation as president of Interpol has put a spotlight on Chinese officials in key roles at international organisations

**Le Chinois Qu Dongyu élu à la tête de la FAO**

Le candidat de Pékin a été élu au premier tour de scrutin à la tête de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour l'agriculture et l'alimentation, devant la Française Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle et le Géorgien Davit Kirvalidze.

23 juin 2019

# China and international standards organizations

## 3 MAJORS ORGANIZATIONS



the International Electrotechnical Commission



the International Organization for Standardization




the International Telecommunication Union

The ISO/IEC framework reportedly accounts for **85 %** of all international product standard

## AN ACTIVE PRESENCE IN THESE BODIES

### Chinese level of participation



IEC technical committees in 2019



ISO technical committees in 2019


### Chinese leadership

IEC	ISO	ITU
2020-2023: President	2015-2018: President	2015-2019 and 2019-2023: Secretary General
Shu Yinbiao, Chairman of the State Grid Corporation of China	Zhang Xiaogang, Vice-chairman of the Ansteel Group Corporation	Zhao Houlin, former engineer of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of China

[@RudyakMarina](#)

30 juillet 2021


Something I did for a presentation today: [#multilateralism](#) [#多边主义](#) and "true" multilateralism 真正的多边主义 in the People's Daily. Multilateralism took off in 2018 and is rising steadily. "True multilateralism" came in Dec 2020, in response to US-EU talks on containing [#China](#).



# Stepping up

## Net contributions to the UN regular budget


Selected countries, % of total



Source: United Nations

## Peacekeeping Contributions by Country

Click and drag to zoom in



### Country

(Click to hide)

— China — United States — United Kingdom — France — Russia


CSIS China Power Project | Source: United Nations IPI Peacekeeping Database

'Chinese Peacekeeping Forces': Latest domestic war film debuts in China

[https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674e3459444f30457a6333566d54/share\\_p.html](https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674e3459444f30457a6333566d54/share_p.html)

**China to provide COVID-19 vaccines to UN peacekeepers at early date: FM spokesperson**

*Source: Xinhua | 2021-03-16*



Tianru Guan & Tingting Hu (2021): Re-narrating Non-intervention Policy in China's Military-action Genre Films, *Journal of Contemporary China*,



OXFORD

ANDREA GHISELLI

# Protecting China's Interests Overseas

*Securitization and Foreign Policy*





## Key PLA COVID-related Military Diplomatic Activities

March 2020 – April 2021




au Japon et, depuis 2017, de la Chine, pour qui il est aussi une porte vers l'Afrique de l'Est, notamment le marché éthiopien, jusqu'ici en plein essor.



# China's Belt and Road Initiative

■ Participating Countries



Source: China's Belt and Road Portal

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
Home / Opinion / Chen Weihua

## There is no need for von der Leyen to politicize connectivity

By Chen Weihua | China Daily | Updated: 2021-09-17 08:02



## China's global port investment




Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.




# China's conflict resolution efforts are focused on countries along the Belt and Road

China's attempts at mediation (2002-2021)



Source: MERICS

# Les instituts confucius dans les pays de la Belt and Road Initiative en 2020.



JC Fichet - Cartolycée  
Sources: Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban).




China's Foreign Ministry: Wang Yi told Taliban delegation the 'hasty withdrawal' of U.S. troops 'marks failure of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan', says Taliban 'a pivotal military and political force' in Afghanistan, expected to play important role in peace, reconciliation

28 juillet 2021

## China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

A planned \$57 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor will link Gwadar, Pakistan, to China's far-western Xinjiang district.



W. Foo, 28/03/2017

REUTERS

# Vers une bipolarisation 2.0?

[https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ekman\\_ifri\\_france\\_routes\\_soie\\_2018.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ekman_ifri_france_routes_soie_2018.pdf)

Emergence de 2 pôles rivaux l'un mené par les US l'autre par la Chine, disposant chacun de leurs réseaux d'infrastructures (routières, aériennes, spatiales, de communication....)

Cohabiteraient 2 modes de gestion des flux (2 systèmes de normes, 2 systèmes d'institutions régionales et internationales) + chacun des 2 pôles disposerait de son réseau de pays « amis »: cf. pays partenaires de la Chine « membres de Belt & Road » accès privilégié aux infrastructures et services gérés par la Chine (satellite BeiDou ou câbles sous-marins Huawei)

Nouvelle forme de compétition entre infrastructures, normes, institutions

Cohabitation dans certaines zones, collaboration dans d'autres

2 pôles distincts semblent peu probables à cause de l'interdépendance éco US-Chine? Mais si la guerre commerciale continue?

Scénario qui ne fonctionne pas si le projet B&R s'essoufle